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Governments have an important role at defining the course of the economy. It is 
crucial, therefore, to understand their behaviour, their motivations and the 
factors underlying their policies, once the economy evolution can not be 
dissociated from the institutional and political background. This paper tests the 
relation between the economy and politics at the local administration level. 
Specifically, using a Portuguese municipalities’ panel dataset, it tests 
opportunistic and partisan behaviour of local governments, either on 
instruments of local economic policy or on local economic outcomes. The main 
findings are: (i) local governments adopt an opportunistic behaviour, observed 
both on instruments and outcomes; and (ii) there is no evidence of partisan 
behaviour whatsoever. These results lead to important issues at light of the 
Stability and Growth Pact requirements. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Governments are a major player on the definition of economic outcomes. 
Their choices on issues like fiscal and monetary policy, trade and foreign policy, 
market regulation, or income redistribution can decisively influence the course 
of the economy. Having this significant role in mind, it is crucial to understand 
Governments behaviour, namely their motivations and the forces that lie behind 
their decisions and policies. The traditional perspective of policymaking, where 
a benevolent social planner’s exclusive purpose is to maximize the welfare of a 
representative individual, fails to rationally explain why we observe certain 
cyclical economic fluctuations, or why economies exhibit particular 
performances at some moment in time. A political-economic framework 
enlightens these cyclical fluctuations, by accounting for institutional and political 
constraints on policymaking, and emphasizing the role of policymakers’ 
ideological and opportunistic incentives. These incentives are one of the factors 
most appointed by economists and political scientists as underlying 
governments’ behaviour, and allow understanding why policies initially 
suboptimal and scarce, are in fact the outcome of rational behaviour and agents 
maximizing their utility. Governments have the incentive to apply policies 
accordingly with their ideological goals, and to strategically use policies to 
manipulate the economy and influence their reelection prospects. By doing so, 
they create a policy and economic bias in the current period and constrain 
policy and economic performance in future periods. 
The research streams basically in two leading lines, following the seminal 
works of Downs (1957), by one side, and Hotelling (1929) and Key (1966), on 
the other. Downs stresses that the incumbent’s main purpose is being 
reelected, which will depend essentially on voters’ inference, based in his past 
policies and actions, about his future behaviour
1. Hotelling and Key present a 
different perspective, introducing the concept of retrospective voting. They 
argue that the incumbent concerns mainly in achieving his ideological goals, 
and that voters largely ignore his past policies and actions, either focusing on 
                                                 
1 This line of research leaded to the Opportunistic Model of the Political Business Cycle, first modelled 
by Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977). economic performance and outcomes
2. In a slightly different and unifying 
perspective, Frey and Schneider (1978) address a model where governments’ 
behaviour is merely ideological, but will reveal an opportunistic behaviour and 
strategically manipulate instruments of economic policy if they notice their 
popularity beneath some arbitrary level near elections. 
Latest research
3 can be allocated between these two different perspectives. 
It departs, in both perspectives, from the basic ideas of time inconsistency and 
credibility of policies, and has some form of uncertainty as key element, either 
about government competence, preferences over economic outcomes, or 
election results. In the research line of Downs and opportunistic behaviour by 
governments
4, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), departing from 
uncertainty about government competence, infer that governments will use 
monetary or fiscal policy to signal the highest competence possible (referred as 
the ability to generate higher revenue or level of public services), maximizing 
their reelection prospects. In the same line, Alesina and Cukierman (1990) 
argue that governments face a trade-off between the policies that maximize 
their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies. In this case 
uncertainty is about governments’ actions or policies, which are not observed, 
complying voters to use observed measures of economic performance as 
proxies of incumbents’ policy preferences. Finally, Harrington (1993) develops a 
model that joins both approaches, stating that governments’ opportunistic 
behaviour can be observed either on economic policies or economic outcomes. 
Following the research line of Hotelling and partisan government behaviour
5, 
on other hand, Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Sachs (1988) present a model 
based on uncertainty about election outcomes, which leads to cyclical economic 
fluctuations on measures of economic performance like inflation, income, or 
unemployment. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) present a model where there is 
uncertainty about future majorities’ preferences on budget composition and 
                                                 
2 From this line of research arises the Partisan Model of the Political Business Cycle. Hibbs (1977, 1982) 
and Fiorina (1981) constructed the conceptual framework of the Partisan Model. 
3 We can find extensive survey of the literature in Gärtner (1994), Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997), 
Drazen (2000) or Persson and Tabellini (2002). 
4 Research has developed with contributions of Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Persson and Tabellini (1990), 
Rogoff (1990) and Harrington (1993), who reconciled the Opportunistic Model of PBC with rational 
expectations. 
5 Chappel and Keech (1986), Alesina (1987), and Alesina and Sachs (1988) brought rational behaviour 
into Partisan Models of the PBC. budget deficits. Under this hypothesis, they conclude that there can be 
observed significant differences on budget deficits among governments. 
This way, rational opportunistic and partisan behaviour can be observed 
either on economic policy instruments or economic outcomes. The empirical 
work tests both types of behaviour largely on economic outcomes, and at the 
central government level. There are a few efforts to apply the research at the 
local administration level, like Rosemberg (1992) and Baleiras and Costa 
(2001). These authors present a new explanation concerning local 
governments’ behaviour: they care with their future income in case of electoral 
defeat, which leads them to boost expenditure before elections in the attempt to 
maximize their reelection prospects. Literature is still scarce at this level, 
however. 
This paper tests the hypothesis about governments’ behaviour at the local 
administration level. Departing from the ideas of Frey and Schneider (1988), 
Rosenberg (1992), and Harrington (1993), opportunistic and partisan local 
government behaviour is tested both on instruments of local economic policy 
and measures of economic performance, available at the local level. 
Specifically, using a panel dataset for 86 Portuguese municipalities, the 
opportunistic and partisan models are tested on components of local 
government expenditures (as proxies of economic policies) between 1979 and 
2000, and on local employment growth (as economic outcome), between 1985 
and 2000. 
Section 2 presents a short analysis to public finance of Portuguese 
municipalities, essential to the comprehension of the model applied. The 
following section presents the model and description of the variables included, 




2. Portuguese municipalities’ public finance 
 
The Portuguese Republic is a representative democracy that has in the 
President of the Republic, the Assembly of the Republic, the Government and 
the Courts its organs with supreme authority. The constitution of 1976 establishes that the democratic organization of the State also includes Local 
Authorities, which on the mainland are the parishes, municipalities, and 
administrative regions. 
Local Authorities are corporate bodies with representative organs serving 
the particular interests of the population in their territorial areas, being 
responsible
6 for its economic development, organization, and for the supply of 
public goods and services like water, clearance, healthcare, culture, sports, 
environment, public security, or transportation.  
Town councils have a major role between these representative organs
7, 
stated not only by the weight they have in Local Authorities public finances, but 
also by the burden of their duties, once it is the town council who proposes and 
executes the annual municipal budget, and entails the municipality plan options 
to follow. The budgetary process is homogeneous among Portuguese mainland 
municipalities, which have autonomy to establish and manage their own budget, 
workers, and heritage, leaving an inspecting and regulating role to central 
government. Therefore, the autonomy at the disposal of local governments to 
establish their own budgets is exercised between institutional and ruling 
boundaries imposed by central governments in the local public finance law
8. 
In Portuguese municipalities, the town council mayor has more flexibility to 
influence local expenditures than local revenues, and inside expenditures he 
can more easily manipulate capital expenditures than current expenditures
9, 
which is the reason why the analysis will focus mainly the occurrence of political 
business cycles in the capital expenditures of town councils. Investment 
expenditures are one of the most important components of capital 
expenditures
10, and include (1) acquisition of land, (2) housing, (3) other 
buildings, (4) diverse constructions, (5) transport material, (6) machinery and 
equipment, and (7) other investments. (3.1) sports, recreational and school 
infrastructures, (3.2) social equipment, and (3.3) other investments in other 
                                                 
6 Law n.º 159/99 enacts the responsibilities of Local Authorities. 
7 Local Authorities representative organs are the Town Council, the Municipal Assembly, and the 
Parishes Council. 
8 Since its institution, Local Authorities public financing has been ruled by Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84, 
Law 1/87, and the current Law 46/98. 
9 Transfers from central government and E.U. to local governments have a significant weight in total 
revenue of Local Authorities. In other hand, salaries are an important component of current expenditures, 
making them more inflexible. 
10 The categories of municipalities’ expenditures and revenues are defined in the local public finance law. buildings are part of other buildings, while diverse constructions include (4.1) 
overpasses, streets and complementary school, (4.2) sewage, (4.3) water 
caption, treatment and distribution, (4.4) rural roads, (4.5) infrastructures for 
solid waste treatment, and (4.6) others. 
Having in mind the rules and institutional constraints imposed by central 
governments, town councils have freedom to decide when, how much and on 




3. Methodological issues 
 
The analysis of political business cycles is based in a balanced panel 
dataset of the 86 municipalities belonging to North region Nuts II
11. Partisan and 
opportunistic behaviour of local governments are tested both on the 
municipalities’ budget balance and expenditures between 1979 and 2000, as 
measures of local instruments of economic policy, and on the employment 
growth rate between 1985 and 2000, as proxy of local economic outcomes.  
To perform the analysis we use the following autoregressive model
12, 
it i it it it v X Y L Y + + + = η β α ) ( ,     i = 1, ..., N;   t = 1, ..., T   (1) 
where Yit  is the dependent variable
13 in the municipality i, year t (mainly, it 
refers to the expenditure category or to the employment growth rate of 
municipality i in year t).  () it Y L α are the lagged values of the dependent variable. 
Xit is a vector of political and control explanatory variables.  i η  is a time invariant 
individual specific effect that allows sectional heterogeneity, and vit is a 
disturbance term. 
                                                 
11 Territorial Unit Nomenclature, level 2. 
12 This analysis follows the specification used in Alesina and Roubini (1992), and Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen (1997). 
13 Budget balance, total expenditures, total current expenditures, total capital expenditures, and all the 
capital expenditures components referred in the previous section are the dependent variables to be used in 
when government behaviour is tested in local instruments of economic policy (all expenditure and other 
nominal variables are expressed in per-capita terms at 1995 prices). As local economic outcomes, 
dependent variables are the employment growth rate, number of firms’ growth rate, and employment 
growth rate by sector. Two dummy variables were constructed to test the opportunistic hypothesis. 
Electoral Yearit  assumes value 1 when year t is an election year, and 0 
otherwise. Year Before Electionsit, by its turn, assumes value 1 when year t is 
the year previous to the election year, and 0 otherwise. Local elections in 
Portugal were held in 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2001, 
always in December. The coefficients associated to these variables should be 
positive, once it is expected a boost in expenditures (or in employment) from a 
government adopting an opportunistic behaviour. To test the partisan 
behaviour, a dummy variable Leftit has been settled, taking value 1 when a left-
wing party detains the town council of the municipality i in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
A set of control variables is included in the estimations. When the dependent 
variable is an expenditure category, the corresponding category of 
transferences is used as control variable
14. When the dependent variable is the 
employment growth rate, Gross Domestic Product real growth rate is the control 
variable. A set of demographic control variables is included in all regressions. 
%Population Under 15it is the percentage of population under fifteen years old 
of the municipality i in year t;  %Population Above 15it is the percentage of 
population above sixty five years; Population Densityit;  Coastit  is a dummy 
variable assuming value 1 in municipalities that belong to districts along the 
coastline (richer and more developed), and 0 otherwise; Population Categoryit, 
which assumes value 1 when municipality is Oporto, 2 for municipalities with 
population over 40000, 3 for municipalities with population between 10000 and 
40000, and 4 for the remaining municipalities
15. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics of the series used. 
 
[Insert here Table 1] 
 
Data on local finances and on municipalities population were obtained from 
the  Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais annual publication Finanças 
Municipais, published from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2000. For the 
                                                 
14 Given the weight of transferences from central administration and from the E.U. to local governments 
in their revenues, it is expected that expenditures will be very sensible to changes in transferences. 
15 These categories follow the ones used in legislation to establish the mayors’ salaries.  missing years some of the series were obtained directly in municipalities
16, but 
data is still incomplete. The percentages of population under 15 and above 65 
years old were collected in the 1970, 1981, 1991 and 2001 Census and in the 
Anuário Estatístico Regional (Regional Statistical Yearbook) published by the 
Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE). Series on the area of 
municipalities were gathered from the Marktest’s Sales Index dataset. The 
consumer price index was obtained from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Statistical Compendium, and data on 
employment was acquired in the Labour and Social Security Cabinet’s 
(Ministério da Segurança Social e do Trabalho) Quadros de Pessoal dataset. 
Political data was obtained from the Portuguese National Electoral Comission 
(Comissão Nacional de Eleições) and from the Technical Staff for Matters 
Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado Técnico para os Assuntos 
Eleitorais). 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002) state 
that the OLS and the Within Groups estimators of α  and  β  in equation 1 are 
biased and inconsistent. In order to obtain asymptotically efficient estimators, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose an estimator based in the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM), which departs from the first-differencing 
transformation of equation 1 and treats the model as a system of equations, one 
for each time period, 
it it it it v X Y L Y ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ β α ) ( ,     i = 1, ..., N;   t = 1, ..., T  (2) 
This estimator, known as first-differenced GMM, uses as moment conditions in 
the above differenced equation the lagged levels of predetermined and 
endogenous variables (instruments of their differenced values), and first 
differenced values of strictly exogenous variables. Supposing the strongest 
assumption that there is no contemporaneous correlation, and that the Xit series 
is strictly exogenous and correlated with the individual effects  i η , the vector (yi,1, 
…, yi,t-2, xi,1, …, xi,T) form the set of all available instruments that can be used in 
equation 2. 
Despite, the first differenced GMM estimator presents a problem, once 
lagged values of the variables levels are poor instruments for first differences, 
                                                 
16 These series were kindly given by the Economic Policies Research Unit. mainly when variables show persistence in time. Further moment conditions are 
available if, however, we assume that Xit  series is uncorrelated with the 
individual effects  i η . This is the case in Blundell and Bond (1998), who propose 
an extended version of the first-differenced GMM, known as system GMM. In 
this case a new set of valid instrumental variables is available for the 
untransformed levels equation, making the system GMM estimator a 
combination of the set of moment conditions specified for the equations in first 
differences with these additional moment conditions specified for the equations 
in levels
17.  
Estimates stressed in this study are obtained using the two step variant of 
the system GMM estimator, asymptotically more efficient then the one step 
variant after applying the finite-sample correction to the two step covariance 
matrix suggested by Windmeijer (2000), in order to correct the downward 
biases in the estimates of the standard error. 
 
 
4. Opportunistic and partisan behaviour: empirical results 
 
We begin by testing opportunistic and partisan behaviour of local 
governments in the local instruments of economic policy. Table 2 presents the 
system GMM estimates for the regressions on total expenditures, total current 
expenditures, total capital expenditures, and budget balance. Total 
transferences from the central administration and the E.U. to municipalities, 
current transferences, and capital transferences are the transferences 
categories used as control variables, respectively, in the total expenditures, 
current expenditures, and capital expenditures regressions. At the bottom of 
each table are presented the m1 and m2 statistics suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) to test serial correlation of first and second order, respectively, and 




                                                 
17 Efficiency is increased by joining the equation in levels to the system. In this equation, levels of 
predetermined and endogenous variables are instrumented with lags of their own first differences. 
18 The Hansen J statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation, and consists in the minimized 
value of the two step GMM criterion function. [Insert here Table 2] 
 
All variables present statistical evidence of opportunistic behaviour. In the 
electoral year and in the preceding year total, current, and capital expenditures 
are larger than in the remaining years, with the particularity of the opportunistic 
effect having a bigger magnitude in the year before elections. Everything else 
constant, real per capita total expenditures (1995 prices) increase on average 
by 12,01 euros in the electoral year and 16,47 euros in the previous year, which 
corresponds to an increase of 4,42% and 5,65% relative to the sample average, 
respectively. Those increases are of 8,54 euros in the year before elections (the 
only statistically significant), in the case of capital expenditures, and 1,46 euros 
in the same year, in the case of current expenditures (relative increases of 
5,09% and 1,19%, respectively). The budget balance, by its turn, decreases 
28,51 euros in the electoral year, and 10,89 euros in the preceding year 
(respective relative changes of ).  
Left is the variable that captures politicians’ partisan behaviour. Estimates 
are only marginally significant (10% level) in the total and capital expenditures 
regressions, and no significant at all in current expenditures, and all indicate 
that right-wing governments have larger expenditures then left-wing ones. Just 
in the budget balance there is a statistically significant partisan effect, indicating 
that left-wing local government budgets surpass on average 71,77 euros per 
person (1995 prices) the budgets of their right-wing counterparts.  
In what concerns to control variables, as expected, in all expenditure 
regressions the estimate corresponding to the transferences category is 
positive, indicating a positive impact of transferences in expenditures. The 
weight of the population under 15 years old seems to be associated at smaller 
expenditures and an increase in the budget balance. With the opposite effect, 
municipalities with a larger percentage of population above 65 years old or 
municipalities located in the coast have larger expenditures and a decrease in 
their budget balances. In an attempt to induce more detail in the analysis, regressions over 




[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
With the exception of housing, opportunistic effects begin on the year before 
elections in all other investment expenditures components. Total investment 
expenditures, everything else constant, are larger on average by 5,73 euros per 
person (1995 prices) in the electoral year, (relative increase of 3,95% to the 
sample average) and 7,65 euros in the preceding year (5,28%). These values 
are, respectively, of 3,43 euros (14,19%) and 6,77 euros (28,03%) in other 
buildings expenditures, 4 euros (12,74%) and 1,68 euros (5,36%) in rural roads 
(diverse constructions) expenditures, 2,87 euros (36,98%) in housing 
expenditures (in the electoral year, the only estimate statistically significant), 
and 6,02 euros (12,33%) in total diverse constructions expenditures (in the year 
before elections). Statistically significant partisan behaviour, in other hand, is 
encountered only in total investment expenditures. Left-wing local governments’ 
investment expenditures are, on average, lesser by 23,98 euros per person 
than investment expenditures of right-wing local  governments. There are other 
investment expenditures components where right-wing parties seem to have 
smaller expenditures levels than their left-wing counterparts. This sign variability 
reinforces the lack of evidence favouring politicians’ partisan behaviour on local 
instruments of economic policy, and enlightens opportunistic behaviour at this 
level as the only significant result stressed by the analysis. Similar results were 
achieved, for instance, in Galli and Rossi (2002), or Veiga and Veiga (2004)
20. 
 
Tests of opportunistic and partisan behaviour on local economic outcomes 
are shown in tables 4 and 5. Synthetically, evidence indicates that employment 
                                                 
19 Partisan and opportunistic behaviour have been tested also in current and other capital expenditure 
components. These results are available upon request. 
20 Other studies find evidence of partisan behaviour at local level. Allers, De Haan and Sterks (2001) is 
one example. and number of firms’ growth accelerate in the electoral year
21, and are relatively 
insensible to partisan effects. Table 4 presents the results for these variables: 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Coefficients associated to the electoral year variable present in both cases the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. Everything else constant, 
municipalities’ employment growth rate increases, on average, by 0,034 per 
hundred points in the electoral year relative to other years (which represents a 
relative increase to the sample average of 0,425%). This increase is of 0,030 
per hundred points (0,283%) in the number of firms’ growth rate. There is a 
statistically significant partisan effect in the number of firms’ growth rate, 
indicating that with left-wing mayors this variable is smaller by 0,203 per 
hundred points, relative to right-wing mayors. This partisan behaviour is not 
confirmed, however, in the regressions on employment growth rate by activity 
sector, presented in Table 5
22 (this is here again reinforced by the sign’s 
variability of the coefficient associated to the left variable).  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
This table presents the results for the activity sectors which show more 
sensibility to the political sector, and indicates consensual results in what 
concerns to the opportunistic behaviour at local level economic outcomes. In 
the electoral year, the employment growth rate increases, on average, by 0,139 
per hundred points (relative change of 0,72%) in the non mineral metals sector, 
0,054 (0,26%) in the construction sector, 0,036 (0,32%) in the trade sector, and 
0,184 (0,55%) in the services to firms sector. With the exception of a marginally 
significant effect in construction, there is no evidence of partisan behaviour in 
the regressions on employment growth by activity sector. We can conclude that 
municipalities present significant opportunistic behaviour in the economic 
outcomes, but present no conclusive partisan behaviour. This result on local 
                                                 
21 As the year before elections’ variable presents no significant results, it was suppressed from regressions 
on economic outcomes. 
22 This table presents the most significant results. Full results are available upon request. economic outcomes is in a certain way consistent with the mayor’s opportunistic 
behaviour denoted in the local instruments of economic policy. In fact, the 
manipulation of municipalities’ finances can help to explain, at least in part, the 
effects observed in their employment growth rates. The growth of expenditures 
here evidenced in the electoral year and, accordingly with presented results, 
mainly in the year preceding elections can be responsible for the boost of 





From the results on Portuguese municipalities, the main conclusion arising 
from this work is that local governments denote an opportunistic behaviour, 
observed both on instruments of economic policy and measures of economic 
performance. There is no evidence of partisan behaviour by local governments. 
In particular, in what concerns to instruments of economic policiy, (i) there are 
significant effects of opportunistic behaviour either on aggregate values of 
expenses, like Total Expenses, Current Expenses, Capital Expenses, and Total 
Investment Expenses, as (ii) on several investment expenses sub-components, 
like Housing, Other Buildings - Others, Total Diverse Constructions, and Rural 
Roads. Two additional considerations on instruments of economic policy 
deserve notice. First, (iii) the opportunistic behaviour is significant and, 
generally, presents higher magnitude in the year before elections (Portuguese 
local elections occur always at the end of fiscal year). Second, (iv) data does 
not allow reaching an explicit conclusion about partisan behaviour of local 
governments. 
In what respects to economic outcomes, there is (v) significant empirical 
evidence of local governments’ opportunistic behaviour on local employment 
growth and on the number of firms’ growth. We also observe (vi) significant 
effects of opportunistic behaviour in some industrial sector’s municipal 
employment growth, namely Industry of non Mineral Metals, Construction, 
Trade, and Industry of Services provided to Firms. (vii) There is no evidence of 
partisan behaviour by local governments on economic outcomes. These results lead at two fundamental questions. First, by inducing frequent 
cyclical fluctuations on local economy, local governments are introducing 
inefficiencies in the economy and rousing a loss of social utility. Second, more 
specific, it may become alarming to central governments the uncontrolled use of 
discretionary policies by their counterparts at the local level, especially if we 
have in mind the short boundaries available to public finance imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact requirements. Therefore, these results appoint to a 
growing control of local public finance and the imposition of sharper rules in 
what concerns to the ability of local borrowing, which would limit the incentive to 
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable  Number 
Observations Average  Standard 
Error  Minimum Maximum 
Municipalities Finances Variables        
Budget Balance  1753  -1.208  24.841  -257.240  699.638 
Capital  Transferences  1753  23.165 16.065  3.451 122.525 
Current Transferences  1766  22.607  28.259  0  282.320 
Total  Transferences  1731  46.124 39.239  4.530 336.267 
Total  Expenditures  1754  58.489 34.447  2.290 318.877 
Current Expenditures  1774  24.721  15.302  0  111.412 
Capital  Expenditures  1761  33.679 22.674  1.890 287.962 
Investment  Expenditures  1759  29.028 19.444  1.890 181.900 
Housing 1698  1.555  4.099  0  69.422 
Other Buildings – Others  1356  2.393  3.378  0  37.176 
Diverse Constructions  1365  20.259  16.746  0  173.496 
Rural Roads  1698  6.287  7.241  0  68.054 
Employment Variables        
Employment Growth Rate  1260  0.080  0.190  -0.906  1.784 
Number of Firms Growth Rate  1260  0.106  0.182  -0.611  1.849 
Employment  Growth  Rate  by  Sector:        
Non Mineral Metals  978  0.194  0.920  -0.956  16.333 
Construction 1245  0.207  1.147  -0.963  30 
Trade 1260  0.111  0.243  -0.622  1.985 
Services to Firms  835  0.336  1.114  -0.95  15.5 
Notes:   -  Sources: Municipal Finances, DGAl, 1979-2000; Quadros de Pessoal, MSST, 1985-2000. 




















Table 2: Political effects in municipalities’ expenditures. 
Notes:   -  m1 and m2 are tests for first and second order serial correlation, respectively. These test the first differenced residuals 
in all regressions. 
-  System GMM results are two step estimates with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and test statistics, 
corrected for finite samples. 
-  Hansen is the Hansen J statistic test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically X
2. 
This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two step GMM estimators. 
-  t Statistics in parenthesis. Significance level at which null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
-  Units: Thousands of Portuguese escudos. 
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Table 3: Political effects in municipalities’ Investment expenditure components. 
Notes:   -  m1 and m2 are tests for first and second order serial correlation, respectively. These test the first differenced residuals 
in all regressions. 
-  System GMM results are two step estimates with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and test statistics, 
corrected for finite samples. 
-  Hansen is the Hansen J statistic test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically X
2. 
This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two step GMM estimators. 
-  t Statistics in parenthesis. Significance level at which null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
-  Units: Thousands of Portuguese escudos. 
-  Econometric software used was Stata 8.0. 


























































































































1,00 Table 4: Political effects in municipalities’ employment and number of firms’ growth. 
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Notes:   -  m1 and m2 are tests for first and second order serial correlation, respectively. These test the first differenced residuals 
in all regressions. 
-  System GMM results are two step estimates with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and test statistics, 
corrected for finite samples. 
-  Hansen is the Hansen J statistic test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically X
2. 
This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two step GMM estimators. 
-  t Statistics in parenthesis. Significance level at which null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
-  Units: Thousands of Portuguese escudos. 



































































































Notes:   -  m1 and m2 are tests for first and second order serial correlation, respectively. These test the first differenced residuals 
in all regressions. 
-  System GMM results are two step estimates with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and test statistics, 
corrected for finite samples. 
-  Hansen is the Hansen J statistic test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically X
2. 
This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two step GMM estimators. 
-  t Statistics in parenthesis. Significance level at which null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
-  Units: Thousands of Portuguese escudos. 
-  Econometric software used was Stata 8.0. 
-  Estimates of demographic control variables suppressed. 
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